Alibaba and Tencent are beating Apple Pay to the punch in China
Apple announced it will introduce Apple Pay, an NFC-enabled mobile payment service for brick-and-mortar sales, in its upcoming iPhone 6 devices.
Apple followers predicted its arrival in the days leading up to Apple’s keynote, but its unveiling yesterday came years after folks first expected the Cupertino-based firm to start eyeing in-store payments. As far back as 2011, Bloomberg published a piece that cited analysts stating the company was working on NFC payment prototypes for small businesses. In the time before yesterday’s event, Google, Amazon, and upstarts like Square have each launched apps and services that aim to replace wallets with smartphones. Their slow uptake makes Apple bulls even more optimistic that the iPhone will take the technology mainstream.
2011年までにさかのぼってみると、ブルームバーグ氏は、同社が中小企業のためのNFCペイメントのプロトタイプに取り組んでいた旨のアナリストを引用した作品を発表した。
昨日のイベントよりも前にはグーグルやアマゾン、そしてスクウェアのような新興企業は、それぞれ財布をスマートフォンに置き換えることを目標にしたアプリやサービスに着手していた。
彼らの遅い取り組みはアップルの買い手をさらに楽観的にさせ、アイフォンがテクノロジーの主流となる。
In China, the uptake of in-store mobile payments is moving quicker. As of January 2014, e-commerce giant Alibaba had installed terminals designed to accept mobile payments from its popular Alipay Wallet app in over 30,000 storefronts nationwide. Its retail partners currently include convenience stores like 7-11, Family Mart, and even Burger King, according to a company spokeswoman.
Tencent, meanwhile, launched a US$814 million joint venture with Baidu and Wanda Group to help boost mobile payment adoption in China, likely through its popular WeChat messenger. It also lets users book taxi rides and buy movie tickets on WeChat. Neither firm has disclosed figures on transaction volumes for in-store mobile payments. But the users – 100 million registered for Alipay Wallet and 438 million monthly active for WeChat – are there, and the infrastructure is steadily expanding.
これによってユーザーは、WeChatでタクシーの乗車を予約したりに映画のチケットを購入するようになった。
どちらの会社もインストア·モバイル決済のトランザクション·ボリューム上の数字を開示していない。
しかしユーザー-Alipayウォレットに登録している1億人とWeChatでの月間438万もの月間アクティブ-が存在し、インフラは着実に拡大している。
Apple Pay will likely not make its way to China for at least a year, especially when one considers the government’s complicated banking regulations and ambivalent stance on in-store mobile payments. Even so, it’s tempting to wonder – if Apple indeed leads the way for in-store mobile payments in the US (though it very well might not), and if Tencent and Alibaba lead the way in China, will the three firms clash? If so, how?
To a certain extent, the motives behind Alibaba, Tencent, and Apple’s commitment to in-store mobile payments remain identical. While it’s a settled matter that margins in the form of transaction or processing fees remain low, in-store mobile payments nevertheless remain an attractive vertical because of the potential to engage users. Consider how mobile messengers like Line and WeChat turned text messaging, likely the most commonly-used feature on smartphones, into cash cows through games and stickers. Much like how we send text messages several times a day, we buy things like coffee and toothpaste every day.
処理手数料や取引手数料の形でのマージンが低いままであることは確固たる問題だが、それにも関わらずユーザーへの奉仕の可能性のために店舗内でのモバイル決済は魅力的であり続けている。
モバイルメッセンジャーがいかにラインやWeChatなどを好きか考慮すると、スマートフォン上の可能性が最も一般的に使用される機能びテキストメッセージングがゲームやステッカーを通じてドル箱となることが明らかとなる。
一日にどれだけのテキストメッセージを送っているかのように我々はコーヒーや歯磨きを毎日買っているのだ。
From the moment we enter a 7-11 to the moment before we leave with a Coke in our hands, we remain perfectly susceptible to retailers or advertisers popping out from our smartphones and influencing our purchasing behavior. But market-wise, it’s still open season. As a result, big-name firms in a position to make a crack at leadership, like Alibaba or Apple Tencent or Google, will each give it their shot.
On the other hand, when it comes to businesses strategies, Apple couldn’t be more different than Tencent and Alibaba.
For one thing, Apple is and remains a hardware firm first, a software (or internet-enabled services) company second. Historically, as other writers have repeatedly pointed out, it has used software (iTunes and iTunes music store, for example), to differentiate and sell its hardware (the iPod) at healthy profit margins. Moreover, unlike most of its peers in hardware, it has never fixated on selling to all customers at all price points. Instead, it sets its sights solely on the high-end, where the money is, counting on its differentiation to keep customers interested and loyal.
Alibaba and Tencent, meanwhile, like most firms that live on the internet, fuel their growth by acquiring as many users as possible. Taobao monetizes by charging for advertising and other forms of visibility, while Tmall makes money with listing fees and sales commissions. Tencent monetized its free-to-use QQ desktop messenger with game-related purchases, and has applied an identical model to WeChat. Neither firm generates significant revenues through hardware sales, though Alibaba has partnered with manufacturers to sell set-top boxes and phones running on its homegrown Yun OS.
Alibaba and Tencent’s investments in mobile payments show how they chase users first, revenues second. Winning the race for retail partnerships is an end unto itself, not a bridge to boost hardware sales. Even if actual profits from these in-store payments ultimately remain elusive, more time on a Tencent app is a win for Tencent. The same goes for Alibaba. Given how Apple’s business model differs from that of Tencent and Alibaba, the former has less incentive to be as aggressive in payments as Tencent and Alibaba.
小売りパートナーシップの為に勝つことはそれ自体の終焉を意味し、ハードウェアの販売を後押しする架け橋ではない。
たとえこれらの店舗内での支払いでの実際の利益が最終的につかみどころなく残っていても、 Tencentのアプリを使うほどそれはTencentの勝利となる。
同様のことがアリババにも当てはまる。
アップルのビジネスモデルがTencentとアリババのそれとどのように異なるかを考えると、前者はTencentとアリババの支払いのように積極的になるための少ないインセンティブを持っている。