Well, lot of learnings – certainly the correlation of risk that Michael just talked about was huge because we never saw a credit and equity going totally into all time historic lows at the same time.
But I think the biggest, we just want to takeaway is that financial models by definition are not – meaning financial models or financial securities, not like that, but on the investment side and then the better options inside, so for products like annuities, those models just don't have the credibility of some of the long-time insurance risk that we've been through many, many years.
We have mortality that's time-tested and large number-tested.
Some of these securities that we model have only been around for 5–10 years, and to think that I'm actuary and I would give the distribution person, perhaps to let the output from a financial model and the mortality model.
They are both beautiful. I mean, they are both there is a mean, there is a distribution, there is a payout.
The problem is you can underwrite, put your money, capital behind mortality, pretty sure that you may hit some of those different points but at least there is a credibility there and just a fragment even if you're going up to the third phase would be around the stock up. I still worry about the modeling in the security's line that seems like a real hard line for us to go after.
My answer to that is we got the liabilities we think need to calm down. Today are a million times less hot than were 5 years ago, but are they still too hot, that's the question.
Mike, do you think Washington has a good understanding about the insurance sector?
I don't think so. I think to be a little bit humorous on it, the assumption is that since insurance has an aim and the bank has an aim – insurance companies are banks and that's the attitude. I think it is very necessary for individual companies in looking at the traits to be active in pointing out the difference of insurance in business models versus bank ones and their one of the subsequent in regulatory dialog.