Township governments, representing the formal state apparatus, are especially
heavily implicated in efforts by village cadres to exercise power. Bjo¨rn was among the first to note that ‘the Chinese Party-state has been using selfgovernment
as another way to control rural politics’. Indeed, the Organic Law
(Arts. 4, 6) states that village committee members not only manage village affairs;
they also fulfill tasks assigned by higher levels. Although the Law stipulates
that townships only ‘guide’ rather than ‘lead’ village committees,
in practice, committees are often treated as line-organs of a township in high-priority
policy areas. Clashes, in these circumstances, become nearly inevitable when committee members
dare to resist unpopular assignments, such as collecting levies,
implementing costly ‘target-hitting’ programs, or completing other
delegated tasks. More often than not, when townships and village committees
disagree, it is the village cadres who come out on the losing side.
Consider assessing levies, a recurring source of conflict between townships and
villages in the 1990s. This thankless task put elected cadres in a difficult position,
insofar as they had to choose between fulfilling orders from above and keeping
financial burdens down for fellow villagers. This dilemma, combined with perennially
low compensation, made office-holding in some villages so unattractive that some
cadres refused to complete their terms.
1990年代の税金の査定の検討は町区と村区間の対立を繰り返す根源であった。
この報われない任務は党籍所持委員を上位からの任務遂行と他の村人のために財政負債を低く抑えるとの間でどちらか一つの選択をしなければならないことに限り難しい立場においた。
この板ばさみは党籍保持委員の低い報酬と併合しある村では在任することに魅力がなくなり中には任期を全うすることを拒否する委員も出てきた。
1990年代にタウンシップと村の間で繰り返し紛争の元となった課税評価を考えてみよう。上部からの命令を満たすか、村民の金銭上の負担を下げるかを選択しなければならない限りにおいて、この報われない任務は選ばれた幹部を難しい立場に追いやった。長年に亘る低い報酬と相まって、このジレンマは一部の幹部が任期を全うすることを拒否したように村のスタッフにとって魅力のないものになった。